The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic by Kerferd, G. B.
THE DOCTRINE OF THRASYMACHUS IN PLATO'S "REPUBLIC" 19 
[ Durham University Journal Vol 40 = n.s. 9 (1947) 19-27 1 
THE DOCTRINE OF THRASYMACHUS IN 
PLATO'S "REPUBLIC" 
" A sophist of the fifth century whom scholars of modem times almost without 
exception have treated carelessly and with less than justice." These words were 
written of Thrasymachus over fifty years ago.' and are no less true at the present 
day. It is the purpose of this article to attempt to re-examine the accollnt of 
Thrasymachus' doctrine in Plato's Republic, and to show how it can form a 
self-consistent whole. When he first enters the discussion (338cl-2), Thrasymachus 
says that Justice is the interest of the stronger or superior. When asked for further 
elucidation he declares that in each city it is the ruling body which is the stronger 
or superior, and whether this be a tyrant, a democracy or an aristocracy, in each 
case it makes the laws in its own interest, so that in all cities one and the same thing 
is just, the interest of the ruling body (338d5-339a3). 
This lea ves the precise nature of Thrasymachus' view of Justice far from clear. 
One or more of the following positions have been attributed to him: 
I. Moral obligation has no real existence, but is an illusion in men's minds 
(Ethical Nihilism). 
II. Moral obligation has no existence apart from legal enactment (Legalism). 
III. Moral obligation has real independent existence, and arises from the 
nature of man (Natural Right). 
IV. Men always do in fact pursue what they thiI)k to be their own interests and 
must from their nature do so (Psychological egoism). 
Position I is ascribed to Thrasymachus by Burnet,2 Taylor,> Cornford,' Barker,s 
Nettieship,' Joseph,1 among British scholars. Position II has sometimes been 
attributed to Thrasymachus' if not very frequently. It may have been the view 
of Grote,8 it is hinted at by Gomperz,9 Lindsay'. and Bosanquet," and is explicitly 
stated by one recent writer, A. D. Winspear,IZ It is, of course, quite distinct from 
1 By E. Schwarz, De Thr4S�m4cho Chalcedonio, Rostoclc 18g2, p. 3 (in Latin), 
);ii�?,ffi.�h:��kr!���;�:t . . . >fi�ht �t�:nrt�f���;$�1� 
Gruk Philosophy Tn/lies to PlaW. p. 121 . 
. rig�t::1: .���il::r�� �f ��te:ut!�or�":'T�:t:. i�'a�jCn:Il!O��d�lII;k.mp���liption. W�t men call 
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Position I-the Nihilist view asserts that there is no such thing as moral obligation 
either inside or outside societies. position II-the Legalist view-does not deny 
the existence of moral obligation, but asserts that .it comes �to existence only with 
the formation of societies, and that its content will vary wIth the structure of the 
society in question (cf 33801-339"4)' . 
Position III was the older view attnbuted to Thrasymachus by Stallbaum and 
is frequent in continental writers.13 A. mark of this .view is that the. position of 
Tbrasymachus is practically identical wIth that of Call1cles 10 the Gorglas, whereas 
the Nihilist view (Position I) distinguishes sharply between the. two posit�on.s." 
Position IV is obviously of a differe�t character from the prece�m!l three-It IS a 
psychological statement and has nothing to say about ��ral obhga!i0n. Moreover 
it is compatible with each of the three precedmg pOSItIOns. It IS attnbuted to 
Thrasymachus by Josephls together with Position I. 
The only way we have of determining which of these positions was actually 
assigned to Thrasymachus by Plato, is by a somewhat rigorous examination of the 
course of the argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Book I of the 
Republic. It is possible of course that Thrasymachus will be found to change his 
position in the course of the argument, but this conclusion must be excluded until 
an attempt has first been made to trace a single consistent position held by 
Tbrasymachus througbout. In this paper it is maintained that Thrasymachus is 
holding a form of Position III, and that he does so with consistency throughout 
the various encounters with Socrates. His position has been obscured because he 
does not state all he thinks right at the beginning of the discussion, but there is 
nothing inconsistent between his various statements in tbe course of the book. 
Thrasymacbus' first statement of his position extends from 338c1 to 339bg. It 
rests upon two propositions: (1) Justice is the interest of tbe str'tnger or superior. 
(2) In eacb city the ruling body makes the laws in its own interest and it is just 
for subjects to obey tbe laws so made and unjust for them to disobey. To this 
Socrates objects that rulers are liable to make mistakes as to their own interests, 
and if tbese mistakes are expressed in laws whicb it is just for tbe subjects to obey, 
it will sometimes be j,!st for them to seek tbe opposite of the interest of the rulers 
(339cr-340b5). In effect be is calling upon Thrasymacbus further to define his 
position and is pointing out that Thrasymacbus is offering two accounts of justice. 
You can either define justice as " the interest of tbe stronger" or as " the laws 
whicb tbe stronger make," but not as both since there will be occasions when the 
two do not coincide. 
Clitopbon, a supporter of Thrasymacbus, rusbes into tbe argumeot and suggests 
that Thrasymachus meant to say " tbe interest of the stronger wbicb is thought 
to be so by the stronger, whether it is so or not" (340a2-c5). But Thrasymacbus 
refuses to accept the suggestion of Clitopbon, and introduces instead the conception 
of the ruler in the strict sense who does not make mistakes. Tbe significance of 
Clitophon's suggestion and its rejection by Thrasymachus does not seem to have 
been properly understood. According to Jowett,lO tbe suggestion of Clitophon is 
" an unmeaning evasion, for though his real and apparent interests may differ, what 
tbe ruler thinks to be his interest will always be what he thinks to be his interest." 
On the contrary, says Joseph,l1 " it is in fact precisely what Thrasymachus should 
have said." What is the truth in this matter? First of all the suggestion of 
Clitophon is certainly not an unmeaning evasion-it is in fact one way of answering 
� ���-;.?�t� �:�tli;�:g!�b!i':�r::4 �:m�ii,·�:;;�,1��:"�r.�7,�RVi!I,�:'W}!i 
�.;::.:: �,lik�e:o� ::� �V�t�tfh��be�lYth::� a! ��� i:�11 0hi: ��::f �J,e::s�b� :ca n!fa.�.!J:�r.z=� cict.. �bedieDee. though the act itseU required of him brinp benefit not to him but to 
l·hdto. to trans. of Republic. p. :IX. StOp. dt.. 17. 
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the objection which Socrates has just brought against Thrasymachus. Define justic;e 
as wh�tever the ruler thinks to be in his interest. Assume that the ruler always 
makes laws in accordance with what he thinks to be his interest. You will in effect'O 
be saying justice consists in obeying the laws made by the ruler whatever their 
content. Or, more shortly still, justice consists in obeymg the laws (Position II­
Legalism). In other words Clitophon has understood the significance of the objection 
of Socrates with its implied demand that Thrasymachus should choose between 
Justice as the interest of the stronger and Justice as obedience to the laws. Clitophon 
says " Justice is obedience to the laws" while saving as much as he can of the 
doctrine that Justice is the interest of the stronger. 
Now there can be no doubt that this is what Thrasymachus ought to have said 
if he held a legalist view of Justice (Position Il)-he must at all costs keep to the 
actual laws, al'd the fact that he does not do so is the first piece of evidence that 
he did not hold the legalist view. But what if he held the Nihilist view (Position I)? 
Here also he should surely have followed the path suggested by Clitophon. He 
would then be maintaining that moral obligatio." does not exist. The illusion of 
moral obligation arises from something which does actually exist, namely, the laws. 
These do not embody anything else but what the rulers think to be their interests. 
Any appeal to an ideal which is not actual, as to the ideal ruler who is infallible, 
'is not only irrelevant, but weakens the whole basis of his tbeolY. If one ideal 
is admitted, why not another, moral obligation? The fact that Thrasymacbus 
refuses to follow this line may be taken as the first piece of evidence that be did not 
bold tre Nihilist view (Position I) any more than he held Position II. 
Finally the suggestion of Clitopbon is not compatible with Position III-the 
tbeolY of Natural Right. This would have been immediately clear if Thrasymacbus 
had spoken of natural Justice (which be never does). If an independent ideal of 
justice is set up as distinct from legal or enacted justice, then this ideal justice 
cannot be defined in terms of obedience to the laws whatever the content of the laws. 
The same is true of Injustice which Tbrasymacbus is going on to set up as an ideal. 
If justice consists in obeying the laws whatever they command, injustice will consist 
in disobeying the laws whatever they command. But as Thrasymacbus is going on 
to set up injustice as an ideal, distinct from legal injustice, he cannot base it simply 
on disobedience to the laws, and this is 'the position to which he would have been 
committed bad be followed the suggestion of Clitopbon. Accordingly I have no 
doubt that here is the real reason why he refuses to follow the path which Clitopbon 
laid before him-be could not do so while maintaining the view which be really holds. 
At all events Tbrasymacbus will have nothing to do with the suggestion which 
Clitophon makes. He freely admits that people who rule do actually make mistakes 
as to their interest (340e6). What be says is that the ruler qua ruler does not make 
mistakes as to his interest, and so in his legislation prescribes what is hest for himself, 
just as we might say no craftsman qua craftsman makes mistakes in his art, but 
only in so far as be fails to be a craftsman. It is the interest of the ruler in the 
strict sense which it is just for the inferior to seek (34oc6·341b10). Thrasymacbus 
in this way chooses to define justice strictly as the interest of the stronger rather than 
the laws which the stronger make in cases where the two definitions do not coincide. 
He is of course as bas been often pointed outla introducing a contrast between the 
ideal and the actual, but there is nothing in the way in which be does it which is 
inconsistent with anything which be bas said previousJy� He is in fact saying that 
there is an art of ruling and Socrates proceeds to exantine the concept of an art of 
ruling on the analogy of other arts (341C4-342eII). 
11 In effect only. because there is aWl tho possibility that .. what the ruter thinks to be � �tere&t o. and 
.. what the laws command" may not be tho same, e.g. through I. mistake ill the dh.fIing of a law. But IllCb 
:.!!��o;i!! ��the'nf:&�� !d��. where 1a� were Ulually.thnple and: abort U<l thero were
 DO 
,u Cf. e.,. Joseph, op. cit. 18, D. J. Allan,· Intto. Rep, J: p.' 2'1. Taylor. PI_to, :269. Nettletbip. cp. Cit •• 29-30-
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Socrates arglle8 that to every Art there is. specific object, and it is the whole 
nature of an art to promote the interests of that object. S� far (to �42C7) this is what 
Thrasymachus himself might have said and h� assents WIthout .difficulty. Socrates 
then argues that the arts rule and are supenor �ver . their objects. Every art is 
:d���e W;!!' !tro=��o�fs:i���?�o�; ��t�es�� t:d JJ��� � �l t�� 
=tes �J tm:,;"ac�� i�h�, ���:nth�mJ:�
lrs' .1� r�r�:�o!h���e;� 
object?". Thrasymachu� holds �t i� .object is. �e promotion .of the int�rest of the ruler while Socrates IS here mamtammg that It IS the promotion of the mterest 
of the ruied. It is by a mere play on words that Socrates equates the object of the 
art of ruling with the ruled, as being that over which the art of ruling " rules". 
Thrasymachus had assented to the later propositions of Socrates with reluctance 
and he now states his objections at the beginning of a continuous speech. Socrates 
had attempted to draw his conclusion from the nature of an art in general. Thrasym. 
achus replies (343a1<1) that the correct analogy is the case of the shepherd and the 
fiock. In the exercise of his art the shepherd may in a sense seek the good of the 
fiock but it is ouly wilq the ultimate end of promoting his own interest (or that of 
his master). That is to say while every art does look towards the interest of its 
object, that object may not be the immediate physical object on which the art is 
exercised, but something beyond it. In the case of the art of rullng the immediate 
object is the ruled, but the ultimate object is the interest of the ruler. There is then 
nothing improper in supposing that there is an art concerned with a specific sphere, 
which has as its ultimate end the promotion of the interests of those who practise it. 
This was what Socrates' argument was concerned to deny, and Thrasymachus 
answers it completely not in abstract terms, but much more effectively, with a single 
convincing example. 
In the discussion of the ruler qua ruler and the implications of the concept of 
an art of ruling down to this point there is nothing incompatible with either the 
Nihilist view (Position I), the Legalist view (Position II) or the doctrine of Natural 
Right (Position III). We have in fact for the moment moved away from discussions 
of justice and injustice as such. But Thrasymachus realises the need for a fresh 
statement of his position and there now follows the fullest account of his views on 
justice. and injustice which we have (343c1-344c8). His statement has hardly 
received the attention which it merits, and it has often been dismissed as hardly 
worthy of serious study.'. 
Before approaching the study of the speech it is necessary to be quite clear as to 
what Thrasymachus has already said. He had begun by saying justice is the interest 
of the stronger. By this he means that it is just for the subject to seek the interest 
of the ruler and this is clearly stated (338e3-4 and 3391>7-9). It seems to have been 
very commonly assumed that he means also that it is just for the ruler to seek his 
own interest.'! But nowhere does Thrasymachus say, hint, or imply that this was 
his view." The truth is that Thrasvrnachus gave his original statement about 
justice as a ·statement of what is just for the ruled and down to the present speech 
�� is�;e�te a=c:s�:et:e (��Ten�m:�� i�C�lth!hl� � "h��g)� t�r r�:�.·���et!fe,��� 
.. The speech is too rhetorical, too rambling to make for success in the present debate."-Allan, Jntro. p. 29· 
R�flI'�h��u:.J;�es(ed�ri:t a�t and aU seriou! aHernpt9 at deliniog justice."-A. D. Lindsay, 
�� ����if:-tf�::: �Diucc:����n� �l�� j���ce�rth:t�; i!lt�fl.'E�etfJ��:�op��l� 3�: 
� ::tt�vl:��E=��be:�t: �:�1��L�;p�;;E:1ti�' :,v��� �r. 
.. m. ori«fal case .... that, cnce the vet1 of hyproc!sy has been removed, it would appear that jut� is simply power: and the losical consequence of· this is that a tyrant is not a very unjult man, bu.t on the CODtruy a "ttly just (IH."-ADao, GP. dt.. p. 29. It 
n It is tnae he tbinb the ruler 0fII'" to � his own IJiter'est, but for Thruymachus, at will appear later, ... "",,,, to betm;ust,IIOf:jast. 
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neither Thrasymachus nor Socrates apply the terms just or unjuat or any of their 
equivalents to the ruler. It was Socrates' insistence on arguing from the point of 
��e�� �� �l:;e�:: !f�h�jJ.'f�r.,;,���� �a':!h':d�����e�k ': ::!�'in�:� 
i.e., the interest of the stronger, but he implies that he seeks the interest of the subjects 
(343e1-7 and 348c12); Likewise he again and again speaks of the ruler who pursues 
his own interest as unjust. I am convinced that it is this false attribution to 
Thrasymachus of the doctrine that it is just for the ruler to pursue his own interest 
which has led to so much confusion in the interpretation of what he says. If WI> 
start from this false view of what Thrasymachus meant, when we come to the 
present speech we have either. to suppose that Thrasymachus has become muddled 
and confused with his own terminology, or to suppose that he is embarking on an 
elaborate reversal of terms and is using a double terminology-his own special 
terminology and the traditional terminology." 
The part of the speech with which we are concerned begins with the long 
sentence: "So profoundly wise are you concerning the just and justice, and the 
unjust and injustice, that you are unaware that justice and the just is really the 
good of another, the advantage of the stronger who rules, but the self-inflicted 
injury of the subject who obeys; that injustice is the opposite and rules those very 
simple just souls; that the governed serve the advantage of the stronger man, and 
by their obedience contribute to his happiness, but in no way to their own." 
(343c1-d1, trans. Lindsay). He then argues that injustice is profitable and in fact 
praised by men, when practised on a sufficiently large scale, and concludes: "There­
fore, Socrates, injustice, when great enough, is mightier and freer and more masterly 
than justice; and, as I said at the start, justice is to the advantage of the stronger, 
but injustice is profitable and advantageous to oneself." 
Those who suppose that Thrasymachus is reversing the usual meaning of 
ethical terms, seem to suppose that he implies four teI1DS-Justice in the Thrasym­
achean sense=the advantage of the stronger, and Justice in the traditional sense= 
the disadvantage of the stronger (cf 343ei-7); Injustice in the Thrasymachean sense 
ought then to be the disadvantage of the stronger, but this sense is not used by 
Thrasymachus, and finally Injustice in the traditional sense as the advantage of the 
stronger. All four terms on this view would be applicable equally to actions by 
rulers and to actions by ruled. It will be seen that the scheme follows from 
(I) Taking the original statement, Justice is the interest of the stronger, as a complete 
definition, intended to cover actions by the ruler as well as by the ruled. 
(2) Attempting to make the statements in the present passage consistent with the 
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position allligned to Tbrasymachua in (x). The full table of equivalenla in tbe light 
of tbe present passage will tben have to be:-
A. Thrasymachus' own terminology. 
x. Justice as the interest of the stronger for the ruler his own good 
and the disadvantage of tbe weaker for tbe ruled, another's good 
2. Injustice as the disadvantage of the stronger for the ruler, another's good 
and tbe interest of the weaker for the ruled his own good 
B. Traditional terminology. 
I. Justice ::,Jh;;'�:-t�;.�t�fe�! �:a���nger ��� ��� r::11e:d �rs
o�������d 
2. Injustice as the interest of the stronger for the ruler hiS own good 
and the disadvantage of the weaker for the ruled, another's good 
According to this scheme Thrasymachean Justice = Traditional Injustice 
(Ax=B2), and Thrasymachean Injustice=Traditional Justice (A2=BI). We have 
thus a full reversal of ethical terms. Though somewhat complicated it would be a 
possible basis on which to conduct an argument about justice. I do not believe 
that any such scheme was ever envisaged by Thrasymachus or anyone else in the 
Republic, but as we have seen it has been asserted that Thrasymachus is attempting 
to argue with two terms, one from each terminology, namely, Thrasymachean 
Justice (AI) and Traditional Injustice (B2), and that he falls into confusion as a 
result. 
When we attempt to apply this view of Thrasymachus' argument to the long 
speech tbe result will be as follows:-Thrasymachus begins with Thrasymachean 
Justice (Ax)-" Justice is in reality the good of another, namely, tne interest of 
tbe stronger and the ruler, and for the person who obeys and is subordinate, his 
own injury." Then Thrasymachus says" Injustice is the opposite ". We should 
expect this likewise to be Thrasymachean Injustice (A2), but we are immediately 
told tbat this Injustice " rules those very simple ju�t souls, so that they minister 
solely to their master's advantage and happiness". That is to say the Injustice here 
mentioned compels just people to seek the interests of the stronger. We must 
accordingly suppose that we have here Injustice in the Traditional Sense (B2).24 
The foolish just people seek the interest of the stronger, so that they will be just in 
tbe Thrasymachean sense (AI). Thrasymachus then goes on to compare the unjust 
man with the just man in respect of the advantages and disadvantages which result 
to each. He gives a series of cases where a man is in a position to choose between 
justice and injustice. The unjust ruler exploits his subjects-he is dearly unjust 
in tbe traditional sense (B2). The just ruler gains nothing for himself by his rule, 
but serves the interests of his subjects. He will be just in the traditional sense (BI)." 
Finally in the last sentence of the speech Thrasymachus says that injustice (clearly 
B2) is stronger than justice (presumably BI about which he has just been talking) 
and so justice is the interest of the stronger (Ax) and injustice is the interest and 
advantage of oneself. As the " oneself" is not specified to be either stronger or 
weaker, this might be either B2 (the ruler) or A2 (the ruled). The latter might 
seem more natural, but the repetition of the passage in Book II (367"4-5) seems 
to make it clear that here also B2 is intended. 
This clearly would involve an extraordinary and confusing alternation in the 
senses of the words Justice and Injustice. In the first sentence we begin with AI 
and move to B2. We tben proceed with BI and B2. Then in the last sentence we 
have B2, ?Bx, then AI and again B2. The shift from one category to another 
would tWice take place in the middle of a sentence. But an even more serious 
.tTbltfsreoognfsed by Allan. SeehlsnoteoD344C7Quotedaboveattheendofn.:23. �I�betbfust ca:: n:mt'1:�Ju�ea1�·a:a:=hI�::� ��e :e!ce� � �� t�h�nC:-����. ha]ttbO:��1 t�: 
::a AI �ti::r:.-a to be the atroager iust because he is _unjust. and the just man the weaker, we' have B-2 
THE DOCTRINE OF THRASYMACHUS IN PLATO'S" REPUBLIC" 25 
�� �j1!c�� ��s�li�e n�t th��i: :eJ�C'� '�� d1tb::t �! 
.identlcal WIth it. Even if Thrasymachus is confused it seems. impollSlble that he can have become as cOl)fused as this would imply. . 
Two expedients which might suggest themselves can hardly be accepted. (I) Take 
���� irJU;�;n����� i���e p��J:��!e,:' j::ti:e:��nfh:jU:'� :fi���� �o�e
i�h� 
����ec�t;!:rh���lo�enga��:����' �f�h�hes���;�rcew�� ::�, '���s�; �el� lc:�� 
injury of the subject who obeys (AI), (injustice is the opposite, the disadvantage 
of the stronger and the interest of the subject-A2), justice rules those very simple 
just souls (AI rules AI).'· This at least postpones the change to BI and B2 until a 
}�\es���s�ft��t" t��e,� ci�ju�ti�e m:���r���;I�p��Si�:j��\�dse��e li���� ;erfr����: 
point of view of the ruler, and that .. the very simple just souls" are the foolish 
rulers, who are deceived by the traditional morality and so spare their subjects. 
The sentence will then run: .. justice is really the good of another, the advantage 
of the stronger who rules, but the self-inflicted injury of the subject who obeys (AI). 
Injustice is the opposite (Az) and rules the minds" of those rulers ouly who are 
simple and so just (BI). The ruled serve the advantage of the stron(:er, and by their obedience serve his happiness and not their own (AI)." But this IS out of the 
frying pan into the fire-it gives a sense to .. injustice is the opposite" only by 
making the confusion between the two senses of justice and injustice worse than 
on the usual view, and in addition it requires us to take "rules" in two quite 
different senses when the words are almost side by side. 
In fact the attempt to interpret the speech along the lines of a "reversal of 
ethical terms" seems to spring from a mistake-the failure to recognise that 
Thrasymachus is introducing a new term which stands at the beginning of his 
statement-" another's good". He is not attempting to reverse the ordinary 
meaning of ethical terms at all-what he is doing is to restate the traditional views 
of justice'· and injustice in a rather clever way to suit his own argument. Through­
out he has only one conception of justice and one conception of injustice:-
Justice-Another's good, for the ruler the interest of the weaker 
for the ruled the interest of the stronger 
Injustice-One's own good, . so for the ruler the interest of the stronger 
for the ruled the interest of the weaker 
Thrasymachus begins by saying that justice is in reality'· seeking another's good, 
and this he. considers is implied by the traditional view as defended by Socrates, as 
well as being his own view. So for example the subject acting in accordance with 
justice will seek the interest of the stronger. He might have added "While the 
ruler acting in accordance with justice will seek the interest of the weaker, which 
for the ruler is the good of another "_this is implied a.little later in 34�eI-7. 
Injustice is exactly the opposite of this, namely to seek one's own good. So for 
example in the person of the ruler, injustice rules over the foolish just subjects who 
seek the ruler's interest. He might have added that a subject who is unjust will 
be disobedient to the ruler and so seeking his own interest, d. 338e5-6. Throughout 
the following part of the speech Thrasymachus always uses justice in the sense of 
T
.y���b'is' intetpretation is fo'!nd in the ei8hteenth century translation of Dr. Speu, and also iD tba� by Thomas 
If The balance of the phrases in the Greek makes this clear by itself-to each of the terms appUecJ to justice 
there is a balancing phrase applied to iujustice. Moreover theid'ln1tp.t,cl"t(uov6P'II�u1d be left without aD 
alllwerlng6itril6i:d6tdIl1"00"a»-rlo,is taken .,parenthetlcal. 
I 
.1 For this use of itP'X1I) ct. Phaedtils 2,38a. , , 
.. Por .. another', Good" as • traditional view Of Justice. sot Aristotle. E.N. V. 1l34b5 and ZHCIQ. 
of t�: �=�.��� ;::�t�� %hctu,::lci tgt ��JU= :.:ot'a=h�r.=.:..reaUty� the � 
a6 DURHAM UNIVERSITY JOURNAL 
seeking another'. good, and injustice in the sense of aeeking o'!e'. own good. In 
, the final sentence be says tbat injustic� (seeking c;>ne'.s own goo�) I� thus s�nger and more aristocratic, and more master-like than Justice. Justice m practice (when 
looked at from the point of view of the ru!ed) ��unts to. �g the interes� of tbe stronger as being another' s interest, while mjustice, whicb IS nonnally possible 
for the tuler only, is profitable and advantageous to oneself. ' 
It is only in this way I believe that a consistent account can be given of what 
Tbrasymacbus has to say in bis long speech. He interprets the view of justice which 
Socrates is offerin� as meaning that justice consists in se�kin� th.e goo� of another. Socrates bad implied tbat this was the duty of tbe ruler m his diSCUSSion of the art 
of ruling. Thrasymachus treats it both f.rom tbe point of view of t�e r.uler and the point of view of the ruled, and accepts It as a correct account, of Justice. But he 
draws the corollary that only foolish people will be just-tbe just ruled are foolish 
in seeking the interest of the ruler (343c6-9) and the just ruler is foolisb in seeking 
tbe, interest of tbe ruled and not his own interest (343eI-6, 34&II-I2). 
Moreover this is perfectly consistent with all that Thrasymacbus bas already 
said, as long as we do not wrongly attribute to him tbe doctrine tbat it is just for 
the ruler to seek bis own interest. The tone of the first statement of his position 
by Thrasymacbus (33&I-33984) sbows that be is already speaking scornfully of 
justice-it is because justice amounts in practice to seeking tbe interest of the 
ruler that it is foolish to be just. Thus tbe statement that Justice is the interest 
of the stronger cannot be treated as a definition in Thrasymacbus' eyes-rather it 
is a deliberate paradox framed in terms such as to arrest the attention, and 
Socrates seems to refer to this fact wben he does at last express himself satisfied 
that he bas arrived at tbe true position whicb Thrasymachus bolds (349a6-8).3\ 
In fact it seems clear that Thrasymachus is speaking from the point of view' of the 
ruled only, wben he says that justice is the interest of tbe stronger. Socrates under­
stands it in this way as can be seen from his question about Pulydamas (338c5). 
Again when speaking of the laws which tbe rulers set up, Thrasymacbus says 
(338e3), .. they declare to be just tor their subjects whatever is. for their own 
interest." Thrasymacbus carefully adds tbe qualifying phrase .. for tbeir sub­
jects."" Finally the very fonn of tbe statement "justice is tbe interest of the 
stronger" suggests it is viewed from the point of view of the ruled. If Thrasymachus 
had meant to describe a just ruler he would surely bave said something like" justice 
is the oppression of the weaker." As long as we remember that the statement 
" justice is tbe interest of the stronger" is made from the point of view of the ruled, 
it will be clear that this justice is "anotber' s good " in the tenns of the long 
speech, and we have perfect consistency between Thrasymachus' 'first statement 
about justice and wbat he says in tbe long speecb. 
What evidence can be drawn from tbe set speecb as to the nature of Thrasym­
acbus' theory in terms of our original propositions (Positions I-IV)? 
Tbrasymacbus bas now openly expressed his scorn for justice and his admiration 
of injustice. Injustice he holds is far more profitable than justice, at least when 
successfully pursued. When asked for further elucidation by Socrates, be brings 
injustice into close relation witb virtue, good counsel and nobility of action, and 
those who practise it are called good and wise (348b8-e9). In summing 'up 
Tbrasymacbus' position (348e9-349a3), Socrates says it is clear that Thrasymachus 
will assign to injustice aU the predicates which Socrates and others assigii to justice; 
and Tbrasymacbus agrees. This sbould make it clear tbat for Thrasymacbus 
injustice is a m'lral, obligation, in all the senses in which for Socrates justice is a 
moral ob�tion. This being the case, it is obvious that Tbrasymachus does not 
bold a nibilist vieW (position I)-if be were denying the existence of any moral 
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obli�tion at all, he could not assign to injustice tbe predicates normally given to 
justice as a mora! ideal at which people ougbt to aim. 
If Tbrasymacbus held the legalist view (Position II), his admiration for 
injustice would be strictly irrelevant. But as the legalist position is itself ethically 
neutral, he could if he wished praise injustice witbout any inconsistency. But he 
could not have chosen the tyrant as his example of tbe supremely just man, nor 
could he strictly have spoken of a just ruler eitber. If justice has no existence apart 
from legal justice, in other words justice made by the laws, then the person who 
makes the laws cannot be either just or unjust, he will be above or outside justice 
altogether. As this is clearly 'l-ot the view of Thrasymachus, we must suppose he 
did not hold the legalist view. 
It should also be clear by now that Thrasymachus is far from being a psycho­
logical egoist (Position IV). His view is that justice is folly and unwisdom, whether 
practised by rulers (348cI2), ruled (343c6), or men in other relationships such as 
partnerships (349b2-5).33 He holds that men are sometimes just and so pursue the 
interests of others. The term " folly" applied to them shows that he thinks this 
is due to foolish ideas on tbeir part and not to external compUlsion. This would 
be quite consistent with psychological egoism provided that the foolish ideas were 
simply mistaken ideas as to where one's true interest lay. But it seems clear 
that Thrasymachus regarded the ruled as foolish because they do not attempt 
to pursue their own interest, but the interest of the ruler, because they think they 
ought to pursue another's interest rather than their own, or at least because tbey 
think they ought to be just against their own interests (cf. 343c6 seq.). The 
greater advantages of injustice seem to be a gospel which Thrasymachus is him­
self preaching. I think therefore we must conclude that Thrasymachus was not a 
psychological egoist. 
There remains the natural right theory (Position Ill). It is only if Thrasym­
achus is setting up some moral ideal other than and opposed to that of justice that 
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way to promote one's own interest is to seek it directly in every particular situation. 
He does not use the terminology of those who opposed law and nature," but his 
equation of injustice with virtue (Arete) shows that he did regard injustice as a 
fulfilment of men's natures. Accordingly he is rightly to be placed among the 
proponents of the theory of natural right. 
An examination of the later part of Book I of the Republic shows that Thrasym- , 
achus still maintains the same position against tbe elaborate onslaught of Socrates. 
But the arguments there raise many difficulties of interpretation which it is not 
possible to discuss here. Nor is it possible to enter upon the many interesting implications of Thrasymachus' doc!nne, if the above account of his position is 
correct. One only may be mentioned. In urging the weaker to disobey the laws 
Thrasymachus is clearly rejecting the rule of law in society, at least where the ruler 
is a tyrant or an aristocracy. But he held that all ruling bodies including democracies 
make or ought to make laws in their own interests (338e). In the case of a democracy 
then, the laws would be seeking the interests of the people as a whole or at least 
of the majority of them. While they might conflict witli the interests of any one 
individual, they would also be promoting his interest in so far as he was a member 
of society. It only needs the assumption of a partial community of interests for 
Thrasymachus' theory to be converted into a defence of democratic government. 
Of course Thrasymachus does not draw out this implication in any way, but it is 
probably a mistake to regard his theory as necessarily subversive of all society. 
or as intended by him to be so. ' G. B. KI!RFERD. 
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